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CHARLES ROBERT BATES,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
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vs.
GENEVA CAROL BATES,
Defendant and
Appellant,

RESPONDENT'S BRI^F
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

The Parties obtained a Divorce in the District Court of
Salt Lake County on April 8th, 1974, custody of their four (4)
children being awarded to the Respondent.

On January 23rd, 1976

the Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause against the Respondent seeking a judgment for unpaid alimony and modification
of the Decree as it related to her visiting privileges.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Order to Show Cause initiated by the Appellant was
thereafter heard on January 20th, 1976, before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft.

At the conclusion of the hearing it was deter-

mined that under the circumstances the Appellant was not entitle

to the accrued but unpaid alimony and that the Respondent need
not pay any additional alimony until the Appellant's living circumstances changed.

The lower court further reserved jurisdic-

tion over the question of visitation rights and ordered that
the children of the parties would not be required to visit
their mother until such time as the Appellant could show that
there had been a change in her living circumstances.

This or-

der was entered March 12th, 1976.
The Appellant, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, on March 19th, 1976, moved that the lower
court grant a new hearing on her Order to Show Cause, and/or
for an amendment of the Judgement claiming that an error
of law had been committed in failing to grant accrued but unpaid alimony.

On March 31st, 1976, this matter came before

the Honorable Bryant H. Croft who granted Appellant's motion
for Amendment of the Judgement as to alimony'payments accrued
and unpaid as follows; $75 in November of 1974, and $150 per
month for December 1974 through February 1975, for a total
Judgement against the Respondent in the sum of $520; however,
Appellant's notion to amend the balance of accrued but unpaid
alimony was denied.
Appellant brought this appeal now before the Court petitioning that the lower court's Order, entered March 12th, 1976,
be set aside and the relief prayed for in the Appellant's Order, dated January 23rd, 1976, be granted.
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT
The Respondent respectfully petitions that the Court deny
the Appeal and affirm the Order and Amended Judgement entered by
the lower court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDERS GRANTING ONLY A PORTION OF THE UNPAID ALIMONY
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 52 U.R.
C.P. AND ARE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LOWER COURTS DISCRETION
BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT.
The Courts of the State of Utah h^.ve continuing jurisdiction as it relates to divorce cases pursuant to the powers
granted by Section 30-3-5 (1975 as amended) of the Utah Code
Annotated which provides as follows:
When a Decree of Divorce is made, the Court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties
and children, as may be equitable. The Court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support
and maintenance of the parties . . . (Id., at 319)
Clearly, the lower court was exercising this power and
discretion when, on March 31st, 1976, it granted Appellant's
Motion for Amendment of the Judgement as to Alimony payments
accrued and unpaid from November 1974 through February 1975
(in the amount of $525) at which time the Appellant was making
her own way.

The lower court was exercising that same power

and discretion when it denied Appellant's motion to amend the
balance of accrued but unpaid support for the period of approximately one year (March 1975 through March 1976) when she
was residing with a man in the State of Idaho.
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The lower

court in its rulings has in no way demonstrated the flclear
abuse of discretion" (Wilson v. Wilson 5ut2d79 at 84)that
must be manifest under Utah case law nor departed from the
"reasonable and prudent1' standard (Flannery v. Flannery 536
p.2d 136

Utah 1975) for such matters in any way that justi-

fies an Appeal.

Further, the questionable living arrangements

of the Appellant are surely a "substantial change in the
material circumstances" (Ring v. Ring 29 Utah 2d 436 at 441)
sufficient to justify the lower court's action which must
fall within the "considerable latitude permitted the lower
court and indeed the burden is upon the Appellant to show
otherwise (Hansen v. Hansen 537P. 2d491 (Utah 1975)).
The lower court under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure did make Findings of Fact in its Order of Judgement dated March 12th, 1976, Appellant's contentions to the
contrary, wherein
...the Court did find that the defendant (the Appellant)
has been residing with a man in the State of Idaho
for a period of approximately one (1) year, and said
defendant advised the court that she was not ready
to get married at this time; and based upon the defendant's testimony, and the Court being fully advised, . . (I_d. P.l.)
The Respondent strenuously contends that the lower court
fully satisfied the substance of Rule 52 U.R.C.P. in regard
to both fact and law by reference to the evidence heard
by the Court, and preserved in the transcript, in its Order
of March 12th, 1976, and by reference to the legal brief
filed by Appellant's own counsel in its amended order granted
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March 31st, 1976.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further
states that "... findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.11

The lower court had, and exercised, the opportunity

to examine the facts and to cross-examine the Appellant and
to reach the conclusion found in Pages 122 through 125 of the
Transcript.

Such conclusions should not be set lightly aside

as the Appellant would have this court do.
The Respondent strenuously contends that the lower court in
no way abused its discretion but merely exercised the power
granted under 30-3-5 U.C.A. and at the same time satisfied in
substance, the requirements of Rule 52 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT BY RESERVING JURISDICTION OVER THE QUESTION OF VISITATION RIGHTS ACTED WITHIN ITS STATUTORY MANDATE
AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5 (1975, as
amended) the lower court:
...shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary.
visitation rights of parents and grandparents and other
relatives ahaLl take into consideration tha welfare of
ths_chlld. (Id. at 319-320) Emphasis added.
By reserving jurisdiction over the question of the visitation rights of the Appellant, in its Order of March 12, 1976,
-5-

the lower court acted within the parameter of its statutory
mandate in the best interests of the children.

In addition

the lower court provided the Appellant with the opportunity
to regain her privileges at such time as she could demonstrate
a change in her living circumstances (Transcript at 122).
The children themselves, it appears, do not wish to
visit the Appellant (see Transcript p. 110, and Affidavit
of Respondent Charles R. Bates dated February 10, 1976,
paragraph #8), and by refusing to force them to do so the
lower court took "into consideration the welfare of the
child(ren)TI as 30-5-5 U.C.A. demands it should.
Indeed, not only the present questionable living conditions of the Appellant, as set forth in the lower court's
Order of Judgement dated March 12, 1976, but also her apparently unstable and itinerent life since leaving the Salt
Lake City area in November of 1974, militate against compelling the children to unwillingly undertake extended visits with the Appellant.
Whether or not the Appellant has been, or is, leading
an immoral life is not at issue here, erratic behavior, as
case law indicates (see McBroom v. McBroom 14 Utah 2d 399),
in and of itself is sufficient for the lower court, in its
discretion, to make change in visitation privileges.
The lower court has clearly acted within its discretion
and statutor2/ mandate in this matter and has not only carefully considered the well being of the children but has left
the door open for the Appellant to stablize her life and
-6-

regain the privileges she desires.
POINT III
THE CASES LISTED BY THE APPELLANT AS BEING SUPPORTIVE
OF HER POSITION DO NOT PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT.
It should be emphasized that the Appellant not only fails
to specifically apply the battery of Utah cases listed on
pages eight through ten of her brief, but also that the majority of said cases are:
(a) not on point with the instant case and,
(b) deal largely with issues at best-only
tangential to the case at bar, and
(c) are in fact, supportive of tfye respondents
position as regards the disctetionary powers
of the lower court.
Even so, because said cases are listed by the Appellant
as overwhelming authority for her position it is the Respondentr:
duty to undertake a tedious demonstration, on a case by case
basis, in order to show the validity of contentions (a) through
(c) supra.

The cases are dealt with in the order listed by

Appellant.
1.

Anderson v. Anderson: 104 Ut 104

deals with the

Divorce of a "Mail order Bride" after a five day marriage,
the Court affirming the lower court's decision for the husband
and denying alimony and a property settlement to the wife.
The Court held that the granting of alimony "rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court" (at P.108) and will be
modified Monly when there is a clear abuse of discretion"
(Ibid)

This case deals with the granting of alimony, not its

modification which is the relevant issue in the case at bar.
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Indeed, if this case has pertinence it is in that it is supportive of the Respondent's position as regards the integrity of the trial court's discretion rather than any
contention of the Appellant.
The Appellant on page twelve of her brief also quotes
dictum from Anderson as if it were a holding which it was
not, as the Court, in an aside, was speaking generally about
some of the reasons for granting alimony which did not apply in Anderson, and do not apply in the instant case either.
2.

Foreman v. Foreman: III Ut 72 concerns a wife's

appeal against a contempt judgement below for failing to
return certain bonds to her husband, and the husband's
contention that the wife should return not only the bonds but
also cash which she had taken from a safety deposit box the
day the day the divorce action was initiated, and which had
later been allowed her by the court below.

As the Court was

unclear as to how the rights of the respective parties to
cash the bonds had been arrived at and computed, the matter
was returned to the lower court for a reassessment.

A case

which it is submitted has little relevance to the matter at
hand.
3.

McDonald v. McDonald: 120 Ut 573 is a case concerning

the alimony that was to be paid to an alcoholic wife, and
again the Court reaffirmed the position that "the (lower) court
having continuing jurisdiction to do so" may adjust the alimony
when appropriate, and that "if there is a substantial change
in circumstances a review and revision of the Decree to meet
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them may be had/1 (at p. 583). Again, a case surely supportive
of the Respondent's position, not that of the Appellant, although the issue of granting the alimony initially is not itself
an issue in the case at bar.
4.

Pinion v. Pinion:

92 Ut. 255. is the famous "mis-

adventure in matrimony" (at p. 260) case concerning the division
of property between a railroad worker and his wife.

The Court

held that "every intendment should be in favor of the trial
court, for not only does he in a divorce case have the parties
before him, enabling him to test credibility by demeanor, but
the conduct and manner of the parties in the Court room sometimes gives much aid in solving who really is at fault, "(at
p. 262). Again while not strictly relevant in that it deals
with the actual award not its modification below, the language
of the Court seems supportive of the Respondent's contentions,
not those of the Appellant.
5.

Wilson v. Wilson:

5 Ut 2d.79.

In this case the hus-

band obtained a divorce in order to marry another woman and on
appeal claimed the award to his former wife was vindictive.

The

Court in upholding the decision below stated that "no firm
rule can be uniformly applied to all divorce cases, and each
must be determined upon the basis of the immediate fact situation" (at p. 82) and further declared that "The more recent
pronouncements of this Court, and the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect that the trial judge has considerable
latitude of discretion in such matters and that his judgement
should not be changed lightly and in fact, not at all, unless
it works such a manifest unjustice or inequity as to indicate a
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clear abuse of discretion."

(at p. 86, emphasis added).

Such a holding and policy statement could not be more in
accord with the Respondent's views and more inamicable to
the Appellant's position even though she cites it.

While

modification, not the initial Decree, is the issue in the
present case the policy annuciated by the Court would seem
to be applicable and most damaging to the Appellant.
6.

Myers v. Myers:

Actually Meyers v. Meyers 62 Ut 90

is a 1923 case which revolved around four central issues:
The first issue concerned whether acceptance of service in
another state and taking of time to plead constituted an
appearance and whether the Court had jurisdiction to render
an alimony Jddgement,issues not relevant here; the second
issue was whether remarriage automatically terminated judgement for alimony.

The Court was of the opinion it did not

automatically do so, authorities at the time being" not in
harmony" (at p. 93), but that it would be " a ground of
application for discharging the defendant from further payment." (at p. 94. citing Kansas Supreme Court) - again not
a viable issue here.
The third issue concerns whether alimony may be modified
or adjusted in the discretion of the trial court and the Court
held it could be modified quoting §3000, Comp. Laws Utah 1917
(at p. 96).
The final issue concerned a discussion of a New York
Statute (Code Civ. Proc § 1771) which permitted not only modification but annulment of past due alimony and the Court felt
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this conflicted with Sistare v. Sistare, 218 US 16 (1910) , and
felt that past due alimony should not be modified for the period prior to an application to modify the original decree.
While it may be that the Appellant can draw some support from
these 1910 and 1923 cases there is no indication as to which
language or holding the Appellant is relying upon, and to what
extent, if any.

Further it should be noted that in the in-

stant case the court below granted the Appellant accrued but
unpaid alimony on March 31st, 1976 when it amended its previous judgement.
7.

Marks v. Marks: 98 Ut 400. Many of the issues in the

1940 case are extraneous to the matter at hand (e.g. Did wife
have right to attorney's fees?

Did the husband actually pay the

support money?etc), but the pertinent holding is that prior to
modification of alimony and child support payments by the court
below such accrued but unpaid monies should be recovered by the
wife.

It should be noted that the wife has granted only token

alimony and that the bulk of the money she sought to recover
was child support money, and it was this money that concerned
the Court most.
Again the Appellant does not indicate how this case is to
be applied, nor is specific language cited.

Further, child

support is not an issue, as the Respondent entirely supports
and has custody of his children, not the Appellant.
8.

Openshaw v. Openshaw 102 Ut >22.

This case came be-

fore the Court on three ocassions in 1934, 1941 and 1942.
-11-

On

each occasion, modification of alimony and child support was
the issue - the husband wishing to decrease payments (as the
child had reached majority) and the wife wishing to increase
Because Mno application had been made to the Court to

them.

abate, reduce or modify the provisions of the Decree ff(at
p. 25) and because the Petition had been "dismissed with
prejudice11 (Ibid) the Court held that it "was powerless
to revoke or modify the provisions of the Decree "(ibid).
This case is not applicable to the present case as the lower
court has already in its discretion, having heard both
parties, issued an order modifying the alimony.
9.

Larson v. Larson:

9 Ut 2d 160 Is totally irrelevant

to the present case it deals with interest upon child support payments and the Respondent, not the Appellant, has
custody of, and supports, the children.
10. _Wallis j^JHfallis: 9 Ut 2d 237

concerns a post-

divorce agreement between husband and wife, reducing child
support and alimony payments which the husband failed to
pay.

The Court found that the husband hadn't willfully breached

the agreement in his failure to pay (being unemployed) and
remanded the matter to the trial court for adjustment and
reassessment of the agreement in its discretion.

This case

reaffirms the Respondent's position, npt the Appellant's, in
that the lower-cmirt's power to adjust matters "as it deems
equitable and proper under all circumstances" (at pc 240>
within the bounds of its discretion is again annunciated.
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11.

Mckay v. Mckay:

13 Ut 2d 189 (actually 187)

This case

involves unpaid "support money awarded for... (a) minor child11
(at p. 188), a matter not pertinent to the present case, as no
child support is involved.

The other issues raised in this

case, such as laches and contempt of court are equally irrelevant
to the matter at bar.
12.

Scott v. Scott:

19 Ut 2d 267 concerns the full faith

and credit to be given to a Nevada decree, and the issue of
modification of such a decree by domestic court.

An issue

which again is not relevant here.
13.

Aldrich v. Aldrich:

119 Ut 504 concerns whether alimony

can be forfieted at the time of Divorce because of wrong doing
during the marriage, not whether adjustments c#n be made at
a later time in the discretion of the Court.

A matter not

of immediate concern in this case.
14-

Cecil v. Cecil:

11 Ut 2d 155 deals with the invalid

remarriage of a mentally incompetent woman, and whether such
a union terminates alimony.

Because of her mental condition

and the fact that she was not supported during the "marriage",
the Court held alimony was not termintaed.

A £ase of question-

able relevance to the matter at hand.
15-

Kent v. Kent: 28 Ut 2d 34. Here the wife entered, un-

knowingly, into a union with a still-married m#n; as she was
victum of fraud and annuled the marriage immediately when the
true came to light, the Court held her right to alimony was
preserved.

Again an issue not on point with tfte case at bar.
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16.

Ring v. Ring: 29 Ut 2d 436, This case affirms' the

need to show a change in the wife's material circumstances
before a Decree can be modified.
The determination has already been made by the court
below as evidenced by its modification of the Decree, such
modification being within the bonds of its discretion.
17.

Smith v. Smith: 9 Ut 2d 157 refers to the matters

of custody of children, not visitation rights, and here the
Court applied (at p. 158) a !fin the best interest of the
children11 standard.

The Respondent has custody of his

children and no-where has the Appellant sought for custody,
hence this case is again extraineous to the case here.
18.

Stuber v. Stuber: 121 Ut 623 is again a custody

case in which the father, although more morally upright,
had a less stable environment to offer his children than his
adulterous wife whose home environment (her mother's home)
was more established.

The Court was unwilling to disturb

the lower court's ruling that the custody of the children
go to the mother and its other findings therein (at p.637).
Again custody is not in issue here and again the
lower court's discretion is upheld.
19.

Dearden v. Dearden: 15 Ut 2d 105 is another custody

issue case almost identical to Stuber v. Stuber Supra.
20.

Peters v. Peters: 15 Ut 2d 413 concerns the right

of the trial Court to order payment of temporary alimony un-
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til the husband paid a lump sum of $2,500 to his ex-wife (he
having received the home and various securities).

The Court

held the lower court was within its right's to so order.
Once again the discretionary power of the lower court is affirmed
although the case has little to do with the matter on appeal.
21-24.

Sorensen v. Sorensen:

25 Ut 2d 163, King v. King

20 Ut 2d 360. Allen v. Allen

25 Ut 2d 163 and Felt v Felt 27

Ut 2d 103 are similer cases in that they hold that a sufficient
and demonstrable change of circumstances must be indicated
before the trial court can modify the Decree in either parties
favor.

Although it is clear that the Court under Const. Art.

8§9 may examine both law and fact, as divorce is an equity
matter (King supra.) and make determinations, in all these
cases the Court remands the matter to the loxsrer court to
make such adjustments and determination as may be necessary
and as it sees fit in its discretion. I
It is then submitted that an examination of these 24
cases listed by the Appellant reveals that the position of the
Respondent, not the Appellant; is most supported by Utah case
law, to-wit:

the trial Court has great latitude of discretion

in making its determination in regard to modification of alimony
decrees and such determinations will not be over-turned unless
a manifest abuse of said discretion has occurred.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant's petition
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should be denied.

From the arguments outlined in this

brief it is clear that the lower court acted fully within
the parameters of its statutory mandate and discretion in
accord with Utah case law, and further acted with the
best interests of the children of the parties in mind.
For this reason the Court should affirm the Order issued by
the lower court on March 12, 1976, and the Amended Judgement
heard on March 31, 1976.

^

Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1976.

LELDS
ley for Respondent
ist 400 South
Lake City, Utah 84111
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